Lectures on Heidegger's Being and Time_14_Temporality

It is appropriate that with this, our final lecture, we have reached a peculiar 'turning point' in the text -- a point at which the text begins a re-turn to the entire analysis; a point, if you will, in which the text begins anew. In a sense, Being & Time begins again and in such a way, indeed, as to show several senses of 'beginning.' And so this last lecture will begin at this beginning and attempt to arrive at some understanding of the sense of repetition (Wiedenholung) that is at work here.

Overview:

(I) A discussion of method

(II) Temporality as the ontological meaning of Care

(III) A repetition of the Dasein Analytic from the perspective of Time

The problem of history and the appropriate 'placing' of the problem of Being.

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Section 63

(I) Method

In this section Heidegger returns to the problem of method and explicitly brings the results of the Dasein Analytic into contact with the method of the Dasein analytic -- such a 'dialectic' of method and discovery, of that which sets out a path and that which is found upon the path, exemplifies the peculiarity of Heidegger's' method which 'listens into' its own discoveries and tries to maintain an attunement to 'the things themselves.'

We began, in the 2nd introduction, to describe the hermeneutical character of phenomenology. The character of phenomenology can be expressed by the structure of the Hermeneutical Circle.

This hermeneutical circle can be expressed on two levels:

(1) first, that the very structure of the Understanding involves a fore-structure which constantly projects upon that which is found. Dasein is essentially interpretive (one always see something 'as' something);

(2) based upon this is the way Dasein moves throughout its life.

I want to develop more closely this latter sense of 'the circle'. Heidegger stated, at the very beginning, that Dasein is ontically closest to itself yet ontologically furthest away. The meaning of this methodological statement can now be seen through the results of the analysis of Care.

(i) Put formally, the hermenuetical circle is the 'relation' of Dasein's ontic, everyday level, and the ontological level that grounds and makes possible the ontic level.

GRAPH

(ii) But we must note, as a result of the analysis, that Dasein maintains itself in a certain kind to understanding, Dasein comports itself through a certain kind of vague intelligibility (Dasein knows how... to live). Heidegger call this understanding of what it means to be "pre-ontological understanding."

GRAPH

In this sense, Dasein has the capability of developing its pre-ontological understanding into an ontological understanding. It has the ability, if you will, to become 'clearer' about its existence -- to gain an understanding of fundamental structures -- of its Being, in other words.

(iii) But the analysis to care has also disclosed an inherent problem in Dasein's attempt to develop an understanding of itself -- this inherent problem is located in the structural moment of Falling which expresses Dasein's tendency to interpret itself in terms of that which is not. The nature of falling is essentially a kind of concealing and, because of this, an appropriate understanding of the Being of Dasein involves a kind of 'wresting from concealment' ("Existential analysis has the character of doing violence" 311/359).This 'wresting from concealment' is one reason for the need of a hermeneutical analysis which must interpret experience rather than merely 'behold it'.

Furthermore, the very sense of the hermeneutical circle arises from the very Being of Dasein itself. Dasein's Being 'is' circular and such a circle must be kept in view if one is to understand Dasein. The full understanding of the Hermeneutical Circle is the following: Dasein maintains an understanding of itself (a pre-ontological understanding), an understanding which, proximately and for the most part, maintains itself in everydayness.

Now, this understanding has the possibility of interpreting itself and in such a way as to uncover the grounds for the possibility of everyday existence. (The mood of anxiety, for instance, breaks through concealment and allows an authentic understanding). The hermeneutical analysis is precisely this self-developing of the understanding towards the existential structures that underlie the everyday ontic existence of Dasein.

The full ｅxpression of the hermeneutical situation would then be something like the following:

GRAPH

The Dasein Analytic began with Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world and interpreted this in such a way as to uncover the conditions for the possibility of everyday existence: the condition for the possibility of Dasein's ontic comportment turned out to be the structure of Care which in turn expressed for Being of Dasein. Our next task will be to exhibit the unity of the Care structure and this will be, by anticipation, Temporality.

(II) Temporality as the ontological meaning of Care.

(A) Meaning (Sinn)

We are to speak about the meaning of the Being of Dasein in terms of Temporality. Temporality will constitute the 'meaning' of Dasein. What is meant here by this notion of Meaning? What does Heidegger 'mean' by meaning?

For Heidegger, the meaning of something becomes bound up with the ground for the possibility of something -- and this, in turn, signifies that meaning is bound up with the Being of something (Being is a 'transcendental'). Thus, to say that X has meaning is to say that X has become accessible in its Being (324/371) We are to gain access to the Being of Dasein (and this Being has been exhibited as Care). Care itself exhibited the structural moments of existentiality, facticity and fallenness. But in describing Care as such, we had not fully shown what makes these structural moments into a unity -- we had not disclosed that which makes possible the unity necessary for the structural whole of Care.

This is the major task of Divisions II (which begins with section 65) -- it is to uncover that which 'makes possible' the unity of the Care structure -- and, as such, the major task of Division II is to uncover the ontological meaning of the Being of Dasein.

(B)

(1) Heidegger begins by unfolding the temporal structures of authentic self (the analysis here 'stays with' the authentic moments of the Care structure while II4 investigates the 'temporalization' of everyday Dasein).

(a) What makes anticipatory resoluteness possible?

The sense of 'anticipation' here can be found in the German Vorlaufen ('to run ahead'). Vorlaufen is a 'running ahead' towards Death as a possibility. Death is not a mere 'not-yet' for Dasein -- in anticipation it is brought before Dasein as its ownmost possibility: this aspect has the sense of coming towards itself (zukommen) -- Now what makes this kind of anticipation possible is simply that Dasein can 'come towards itself' in this manner. But this coming toward (zukommen) is, for Heidegger, the primordial phenomenon of the future (Zukenff)...[ck Anticipation is make possible for the future.]

(b) Authentic 'being guilty' manifests the negativity of Dasein's thrownness. A resolute 'taking up' of this 'being guilty' involves taking over one's Being as thrown ie., Dasein does not bring itself into its 'there', but rather, Dasein has always already be assigned to a 'world' -- Dasein always already has been -- a taking over of this thrownness would mean to be as always already having been.

This sense of having been (Gewesenheit) is the sense of 'Past' -- it is expressed dynamically (ie., as reference to the future) as "I am as having been" (Ich bin-gewesen). The 'Past' is constantly 'taken up' by Dasein's futural projects -- it is never a mere 'no longer'.

(c) The present is made to come to pass in the sense of a 'making present (Gegenwartegens). It is 'born' of the dynamic interplay of future and past. Thus the present, in this authentic mode, arises out of other moments. It is never an isolated, discreet "now".

(2) In consequence of this, the phenomenon of the authentic self shows itself as having the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been.

This unity which makes possible the authentic self of Care is called by Heidegger Temporality (Zeitlichkeit). As such, temporality is the meaning (ie., the ground for the unity and possibility) of authentic Care. Time is the meaning of the Being of Dasein. And this is the first indication of how the Being of Dasein is grounded in Time, of how Being and Time are brought together in the Dasein Analytic.

(3) This 'connectedness' between Dasein and Temporality can be further seen by noting how each moment is the Care structure resolves itself into a temporal moment:

Existentiality: 'ahead of itself' -- futural (as 'coming towards')

Facticity: 'being already in' -- 'past' (as 'having been')

Falling: 'being alongside' -- present (as 'making present)

It is important to note that this is not a matter of 'mere correspondence,' for we have indicated that the temporal structure makes possible the unity of the existentials -- it can do this only because temporality itself is essentially a unity.

(4) Further comments on Temporality

(a) The essential unity of temporality lies in its ecstatical character. Each of the temporal moments has the sense of 'standing out' in a certain direction -- each direction begin an 'ecstasis' of Time. And the essence of temporality consists in the temporalizing unity of the ecstases. Time is dynamic and 'self-blending' through and through -- its primordial sense is not to be conceived of as some kind of container in which things occur 'in' time with the movement of a series of 'nows', each one of which occurring between a 'not-yet' and a 'no-longer' -- this is a derivative sense of time which misses the ecstatical unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been.

(b) one must note further, however, that within the ecstatical unity of time there lies a priority of the future.

(5) It is from this revaluation of the Care structure in terms of Temporality that Heidegger begins a 'repetition' of the Dasein Analytic. For if temporality has indeed manifested itself as the meaning of the Being of Dasein then it must be shown to underlie Dasein in both its authentic and inauthentic modes of existenz and with this the very structure of Being in the world.

It is precisely for this reason that the text begins 'anew'.

This is the task of II

III A repetition of the Dasein Analytic from the perspective of Time.

(A) The repetition has the following order:

(1) The temporality of disclosedness in general

(a) Temporality of Understanding

(b) Temporality of Befindlichkeit

(c) Temporality ofFalling

(d) Temporality of discourse

The analysis then goes on to show how these structures (as the basic structures which constitute the Being of the 'Da' of Dasein) in turn temporalize Being-in-the-world.

(2) The temporality of Being-in-the-world

(a) circumspective concern

(b) the modification of readiness-to-hand into presence-at-hand

(c) the worldhood of the world and Dasein's spatiality

(d) Dasein's everydayness

(Note: it is from this final analysis of Dasein's everydayness that Heidegger develops the problem of History II5 and the everyday understanding of time II6).

To gain an appreciation of these analyses I want to look briefly at Heidegger's analysis of the temporality of Verstehen (section 68a)

(B) The Temporality of Verstechen

We must note, in anticipation, that any temporal moment because of (i) its ecstatical structure and (ii) its grounding of Dasein's Existenz and with this the modes of authenticity and inauthenticity, will spiral out into a multiplicity of structures.

Let us see how this occurs:

(1) As a projection upon one's potentiality-of-being the understanding as 'ahead-of-itself' has been appropriately characterized as primarily futural. But we have seen that the understanding can develop itself in different 'direction' (towards that which it is 'not', toward that which it is).

Accordingly, there will be two modes of its development:

(a) its authentic mode is expressed by anticipation in which Dasein 'lets itself come toward itself as is ownmost potentiality-for-Being.'

(b) 'inauthentic' understanding, on the other hand, projects itself upon its concerns ie., its everyday business -- and this is expressed by awaiting. Dasein relates itself through possibilities but it does so through the meditation of things (of beings within the world). Dasein comes towards itself (is futural) but in terms of the things of its 'concern' -- Dasein's 'future' is this concerned with these things and whether they will 'come about' or 'fall apart'.

Note: Though the understanding is primarily futural, the future is an ecstasis of Time and as such it must temporalize itself in unity with the other ecstases.

Accordingly, the temporality of understanding will involve the moments of presence and having-been.

(2) The 'Present'

(a) To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belongs a 'present' in which Dasein's situation (its existential double nullity) is disclosed. Heidegger calls this moment of awareness the authentic present which he terms, with reference to Kierkegaard, der Augenblick.

(b) The inauthentic present is a 'making present' which finds its ｅxpression in the turblance of Dasein's Falling (the ｅxpression "What should I do now?" and then after that" etc. gives the sense of this 'present': it is Dasein's constantly leaping after 'new' possibilities)

(3) The 'Past'

(a) Dasein's authentic 'coming-towards-oneself' in anticipatory resoluteness is at the same time a coming back to one's ownmost self: it is a 'taking over' of what one 'already is', a taking hold of one's self again. Dasein can take over that Being which it already is -- and, when a 'homecoming' has occurred, one can speak of a certain kind of repetition (Wiederholen)

(b) The inauthentic having-been involves the manner in which Dasein can lose itself in its everyday concerns. Now such a losing of oneself can involve the character of a certain kind of forgetfulness (vergessenheit)

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Note the terms that were used with reference to Dasein's understanding itself in reference to its 'Past'. In anticipating, Dasein brings itself again forth into its Being. Such a 'bringing forth again' Heidegger characterized by repetition. Inauthentic having-been has the possibility of concealing one's Being through a kind of forgetfulness of Being.

With this we have arrived at the structural moment in Dasein itself (viz., the modality of 'Past' in the understanding) which allows the specific task of Sein and Zeit to take its initial point of departure. For this 'relation' between repetition and forgetfulness was in fact the very 'play' which provoked the very beginning of "Being and Time." What had occurred to the question of Being was that it had fallen into a kind of forgetfulness -- and what was needed was a repetition of the question of Being (section 1). The treatise has thus circled back to a deeper understanding of its own Beginning.

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Copyright: Robert Cavalier
Department of Philosophy / Carnegie Mellon University