Lectures on Heidegger's Being and Time_4_First Introduction

It might be helpful, on this journey through Heidegger's "Being and Time," to consider these thoughts on thinking:

"The thinker is trying to trace a furrow in human language as the peasant traces a furrow across a field" Heidegger, Letter on Humanism (1949)

"Our thinking should have a vigorous fragrance, like a wheatfield on a summer's night" Nietzsche (1895)

Untitled first page:

In the literal sense, Being and Time begins within a Platonic Dialogue (the Sophist 244a). It begins with a problem rooted in ancient (i.e. Greek) thought. Specifically, the dialogue is concerned with the problem of being. The context is one in which certain 'story tellers' about being (who happen to be materialists describing being in terms of hot and cold, etc.) have become 'perplexed' about the meaning of the term they used. Heidegger chooses this to show how the problem of being in this dialogue has become perplexing, has itself become problematic. He then asks if we today have an answer to this question and immediately points out that we are not even perplexed by the problem (of Being). Accordingly, the task of the first section will be to re-awaken that perplexity over the question of Being, to reawaken the meaning of the question.

Section 1

Heidegger seeks to find a place for the central question by giving it a context.

The person of today is in need of perplexity, but the need is different from that of 'past times'. For us, the question has already been posed (by Plato and Aristotle), we need to regain something that was once decisively accomplished.

Our forgetfulness needs to be regained by means of a repetition (Kierkegaard's Wiederholung i.e. not a 'mere repeating').

We need to repeat (to ask) the question--but we must do so from the perspective of modernity, from the perspective of a philosophical tradition that has in many respects covered over the original force of the question (e.g., analytic philosophy).

There has developed a dogma which covers over the questionableness of the question.

Furthermore, the very roots of this concealment lie in the very ontology in which it was first raised (ancient ontology).

What is needed is a restoration of the questionableness of the question. And, to do this, Heidegger interrogates the objections to the question of Being--and he does this in such a way as to 'turn the objections on their heads'--he is going to make the objections, if you will, objectionable and thus clear the way for a reformulation of the question (of Being).

The objections (first 2 are negative, third is positive)

(1) The first objection: Being (Sein) is the most universal concept.

Two parts, the first negative, the second positive:

A. The quotations from Aristotle show the internal problem contained in this 'objection'

Metaphysics (1001a) Being is the most universal term
(998b) It is impossible for Being to be a genus.

Now, the Aristotelian concept of definition (through genus and specific difference) created an inner tension here with regard to the notion of Being.

Being

Living/non-living

Living/animal/rational ('man')

For example, the distinction between living and non-living (as examples of a 'higher genus') could be defined as specific differences with a still higher genus called Being (which presumably, is the highest and 'most universal') genus. But now what of Being? How is it to be defined? What can be 'brought in' to show it as a specific difference? Manifestly, nothing.

Thus reflection of the universality of Being has disclosed a problem with Being. The universality of Being has become questionable.

II A clue (the 'universality' of Being is a universal transcendental). Aristotle in books IV and VII of the Metaphysics glimpsed into the solution of the problem by taking Being as equivocal by analogy (Brentano) [reference (Owens)]. The multiplicity of beings have reference to a unity: the unity of the concept of Being lies in the fact that anything which "is" in any way has reference to one and the same thing--and this gathering ground for the unity is, for Aristotle, substance. The question then is posed: to what extent is Being collected into a unity by substance. Aristotle interrogates Being by interrogating substance. At this point Heidegger claims that the questioning was raised to its highest level. Heidegger, on the other hand, will interrogate Being (Sein) by interrogating Dasein (the 'there', or 'place' for the occurrence of Being). To what extent is Being collected into a unity by Dasein?


(2) The concept of Being is indefinable.

This objection rests upon the notions that Being is 'genus'. But the first objection disclosed something problematical about ascribing Being to the nature of genus. Thus, if Being is not a genus, then the problem of defining it in terms of 'closest genus' and 'specific difference' no longer applies. Yet the objection that it is indefinable rests on just such an assumption. Therefore this objection no longer applies. Heidegger also notes here in this connection that part of the indefinability of Being results from the fact that it is not an entity. Being (Sein) is not an entity (Seiende). [In his Letter on Humanism he clarifies this further: Being is not God, nor some ground of the world (Weltgrund)].

(3) The concept of Being is self-evident

(a) It is the 'most understood' (i.e. we all know what it means 'to be' i.e. to be at home, to be unhappy etc. ) But this 'average understanding' only serves to cover over the perplexity of the concept (we tend to take it for granted and fail to understand anything questionable about the term). Yet the problems in the previous two objections have shown it to be, on a reflective level, questionable--and far from self-evident.

(b) But this should not obscure the fact that we do have a vague comprehension of the meaning of being (we use the term all the time). This will constitute a positive, phenomenal direction for the investigation. This pre-ontological understanding of the meaning of Being will be the phenomenal (manifest) guide to a deeper (ontological) understanding of the meaning of Being.

****
Heidegger has let the objections themselves show how perplexing the question of Being really is. The point is now reached in which we can attempt to re-engage in the question, where one can now repeat the question.


Section 2 This section has two main divisions: the first deals with the problem of questioning, the second deals with a charge of 'circularity'.

I The result of overcoming the objections has shown that not only is there a problem in seeking the answer, but the kind of questioning involved in this question is also a problem. Here, Heidegger engages in a questioning of Question i.e. first (1) he is going to seek the structure of questioning as such then (2) the specific question of Being (das Seinsfrage).

(1) The formal structure of questioning a such: Every question is a 'seeking' (Suchen) and is guided by what is sought (Gesuchen). There is a mutual relatedness ('circularity') between these two poles: (a) seeking is directed to what is sought but (b) the seeking is already guided by what is sought (in advance). Let's look more closely at the structural moments of 'what is sought':

das Gefragte--that which is asked about
das Befragte--that which is questioned (that which is immediately subject to interrogation).
das Erfragte--that which is to be found out.

Heidegger is making explicit what is implicit in questioning--this seems to be a development of Nietzsche and has today become a central theme in European thought viz. truth and method. [Note: das Erfragte is what is really intended in das Gefragte. The disclosure of das Erfragte is essentially the fulfillment of das Gefragte: And this again refers to the necessity of re-evaluating the very structure of 'questioning-answering' (cf. Husserl L.I. I Meaning intention--Meaning fulfillment)]

(2) The formal structure of the question of Being (das Seinsfrage)

The questioning about Being is going to be guided (directed) by some [everyday, average ('pre-ontological')] understanding of Being.

The structural moments:

das Gefragte--Being (Sein)
das Befragte--some particular being (Seiende)
das Erfragte--the meaning of Being (der Sinn von Sein)

beings (Seiende) are to be questioned about their Being (Sein) in such a way as to find out the meaning of Being (der Sinn von Sein).

Now, with emphasis upon the direction of this course:

Question: which 'being' is going to be interrogated with respect to its Being and, in such a way, that the meaning of its Being becomes uncovered. That is to say, which 'being', 'entity' is going to become das Befragte, that which is to be 'interrogated'?

Again, which beings are to provide a 'place' in which Sein & Zeit can begin its questioning? Which entity is the appropriate entity to be questioned regarding its Being?

Heidegger approaches this problem in the following way: If the question of Being is to be posed, to be looked at and conceptually understood, then this very posing of the question presupposes a being that 'poses questions', 'looks at' things and 'gains access': the question of the meaning of Being seems to point to a particular being that is (among other things) a questioner, a being (Seiendes) for whom something like Being (Sein) can become a question, an issue.

Thus, the question itself seems to draw in a particular kind of entity. The being (Seiendes) to be interrogated (das Befragte) as to its Being (das Gefragte) manifests itself as a questioner.

And that being that has questioning as one of its possibilities of Being is Dasein.

Dasein will become thematized as the 'place' (stella), the there ('Da') of Being (Sein).

II The charge of circularity

Now by seeing the way they question draws the questioner into it, we can begin to see the kind of thematic reflexivity involved here. Dasein is essentially going to question itself as to the nature of its Being.

In doing so, it need not have a clear, fully thematized concept of its nature, rather, it merely needs some 'already granted' self-comprehension, 'knowing-how' (from which it might develop a more thematized understanding). [think of the example of 'knowing how' to drive a car without 'knowing' the car--but with Dasein the connection is reflexive] Self-comprehension here means simply that human beings know how to live--and Heidegger calls the vague understanding--pre-ontological.

The 'circle' is within Dasein itself: the question (Being) and the questioner (a being) stood in an immediate (though by no means obvious) relationship--Dasein will interrogate itself in regard to its own being. Thus, in a fundamental sense, Sein und Zeit begins with Dasein.

Section 3 (briefly)

This section refers back to Section 1: it serves, in a positive manner, to provoke the necessity for repeating the question of Being. How so? But stating the ontological priority of the question:

How one conceives of the determination of Being 'determines' how one will view beings.

[illustration]

[Note how the different conception at the fundamental level will 'affect' conceptions on the ontic levels.]


Section 4 (Briefly): Refers back to Section 2

We noted how the reflexivity of the Seinsfrage discloses how the questioner is drawn into the question in that very unfolding of the question and this provided the 'clue' for choosing the kind of entity to be interrogated. Now this section seeks to clearly identify the priority of choosing Dasein as the entity to be interrogated (das Befragte).

Dasein pg. 34 takes priority ontically:

(1) because it is our only entity (on the ontical level) that has Existenz ontologically

(2) because of this, because of its 'kind of understanding', it can achieve an understanding of its ontological structures. (It can achieve a self-understanding)

(3) Further ontic-ontological prioirty: It can achieve an ontological understanding of all those ontic (or existentiell) structures other than itself. It can understand the ontological structures of all other entities.

And, with this, Dasein has justified itself as that entity which is to serve as das Befragte.

 

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Copyright: Robert Cavalier at rc2z@andrew.cmu.edu
Department of Philosophy / Carnegie Mellon University